Gulf states face an impossible choice after Iranian missiles struck their cities: remain passive, or risk being seen as fighting alongside Israel.
Doha, Qatar— When Iranian missiles slammed into Gulf capitals and cities over the weekend, they shattered more than glass and concrete – they also were a blow to the Gulf states’ carefully cultivated image as oases of stability, insulated from the crises and conflicts in the rest of the Middle East.
Now, countries in the region face what analysts describe as an impossible choice: strike back and risk being seen as fighting alongside Israel, or remain passive while their cities burn.
Yet even as smoke rose over their skylines, a chorus of regional voices urged restraint – warning that the Gulf states must not be pulled into a war they never wanted and do not consider their own.
Qatar’s former prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, cautioned in a post on X that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran”, even though Tehran “violated the sovereignty of the Council’s states and was the aggressor”.
“There are forces that want the Council’s states to become directly embroiled with Iran,” Sheikh Hamad wrote.
“But a direct clash between the Council’s states and Iran, if it occurs, will deplete the resources of both sides and provide an opportunity for many forces to control us under the pretext of helping us escape the crisis.”
He urged the GCC to act as “a single, unified hand in confronting any aggression”, while avoiding being “picked off one by one”.
The remarks reflect a broader sentiment across the Gulf that this is not their fight. Faisal Al-Mudahka, editor-in-chief of the Doha-based Gulf Times, put it bluntly: “This is Israel and the US’s war, and it has nothing to do with us. We are just stuck in this geopolitical location.”
“The Gulf is all about prosperity, development, security and dialogue,” Al-Mudahka told Al Jazeera. “We are not war seekers. We don’t want to be dragged into this war for the ideology of Netanyahu and the ideology of Iran.”
The attacks came as Iran retaliated against a massive joint US-Israeli assault that began on Saturday. The operation killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior military leaders, and struck military and government sites across Iran. A school was also hit, and at least 148 people were killed in that strike alone.
Tehran retaliated with missiles and drones targeting Israel and US military assets across the Gulf, killing at least three people in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where at least 58 people had been injured as of Sunday evening. Either missiles – or debris after they were intercepted – hit landmark buildings and the airport in Dubai, high-rises in Manama, and Kuwait’s airport, with smoke also seen billowing from some neighbourhoods in Doha. Saudi Arabia said Iran also struck Riyadh and its eastern region. Qatar said 16 people had been injured on its soil, while five people were injured in Oman, 32 in Kuwait and four in Bahrain. The UAE also recalled its ambassador to Israel – a stark signal of Gulf frustration with the trajectory of events.
A war they tried to stop
The Gulf states did not want this confrontation. In the weeks leading up to the attack, Oman had been mediating indirect talks between Washington and Tehran, with Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi declaring that peace was “within reach” after Iran agreed never to stockpile enriched uranium and to dramatically dilute its existing enriched uranium.
Still, hours later, the US and Israel launched missiles.
Al-Mudahka questioned why the war escalated when Oman had secured a deal he described as “better than the Obama deal”. He said Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani had lobbied Washington extensively not to use Gulf bases for operations against Iran.
He was equally critical of Iran’s response, describing Tehran as being in “panic mode” after losing its leadership.
Iran’s justification – that it is striking US bases, not the host countries – showed “a lack of understanding of international relations”, Al-Mudahka added.
He expressed confidence that the GCC would stand firm on refusing to allow US or Israeli operations from their airspace.
An impossible choice
Yet despite the Gulf’s desire to stay out of the conflict, analysts say the region faces an agonising dilemma.
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“For people and political leaders here, seeing Manama, Doha and Dubai bombed is as strange and unimaginable as seeing Charlotte, Seattle, or Miami bombed would be for Americans,” Monica Marks, a professor of Middle East politics at New York University Abu Dhabi, told Al Jazeera.
The Gulf states, she said, had “seen this war coming in slow motion for weeks, if not months, and have exerted a huge amount of effort to stop it”.
They knew, Marks added, that a cornered Iranian regime would “choose fratricide before suicide”, taking its Gulf neighbours hostage rather than accepting defeat.
Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer at King’s College London, agreed that the Gulf states had tried hard to prevent military action.
“The GCC states did not want this war. They tried to lobby against it,” he told Al Jazeera. Against that backdrop, he said, the prospect that they might join the war — and be seen as “working with the Israelis, is a huge challenge for their legitimacy”.
Yet remaining passive carries its own risks. Pinfold described the Gulf states’ predicament as a “conundrum”: doing nothing while Iran strikes repeatedly is just as damaging to their standing as entering the war.
“At the end of the day, these governments are responsive to popular opinion,” he said. “They want to be seen as protecting their people, protecting their territory and their sovereignty.”
Both analysts suggested the Gulf states may ultimately choose to act – but on their own terms.
Pinfold argued they are more likely to launch strikes themselves, possibly through a joint GCC effort like the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), rather than simply opening their airspace for US and Israeli operations.
The PSF was a unified army created in 1984 by the GCC, which evolved into the Unified Military Command in 2013.
“They don’t want to be seen as working for Israel or working with Israel,” he said. “They want to be seen as leading, not just following.”
This would allow the Gulf states to “get in the driving seat” and demonstrate agency after weeks of being sidelined, Pinfold added.
Nightmare scenarios
The immediate fear for Gulf leaders centres on their most vulnerable infrastructure. Marks identified what she called the “real nightmare scenario”: Strikes on power grids, water desalination plants and energy infrastructure.
“Without air conditioning and water desalination, the scorching hot and bone-dry Gulf countries are essentially uninhabitable,” she said.
“Without energy infrastructure, they’re unprofitable. Gulf states will take whatever steps they deem will least jeopardise those interests.”
Al-Mudahka framed the crisis as one with consequences far beyond the Gulf. Sixteen percent of the world’s energy comes from Qatar, he noted, and 33 percent of global oil flows from the wider region through the Strait of Hormuz.
“This is not only about Qatar and Bahrain. This is the most important geopolitical location for the world’s energy supply,” he said.
“If something happened here, there will be no electricity in Osaka. Fuel prices in China will spike. Will the US be happy with oil at $200 a barrel?”
Pinfold, however, argued that the deeper threat is not physical but reputational.
The lasting damage, he warned, would be to the Gulf states’ soft power – their brand as stable, predictable havens for investment and tourism in a turbulent region.
For his part, Al-Mudahka pushed back against any suggestion that the attacks represented a fatal blow to the Gulf’s image as an island of stability.
“The GCC have faced many challenges,” he said. “This is an important location – it has been since the Silk Route. The GCC has never been involved in a war. It has always taken a defensive posture.”
Al-Mudahka pointed to Qatar’s track record of facilitating dialogue and ending conflicts, including the US-Taliban talks that ended America’s longest war.
He also noted the outpouring of international solidarity with Qatar and the Gulf region in recent days.
A new era of state-on-state war?
Sheikh Hamad, in his post on X, warned that new dangers lie ahead regardless of how this immediate crisis ends.
“After this battle concludes, new forces will emerge in the region, and Israel will hold sway over our region,” he wrote.
“The Council’s states have no choice but to act as a single, unified hand in confronting any aggression against them, rejecting any attempt to impose dictates or blackmail them.”
The analysts noted that the current crisis marks a dramatic shift in regional security dynamics. For years, the Gulf states focused their concerns on non-state actors such as the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon.
That calculus has now changed.
“What we’re seeing is a new paradigm in the Middle East, or a return to a very old paradigm, of state-on-state warfare,” Pinfold said.
“We’re not seeing as much grey zone warfare in terms of disinformation, proxy war, and whatnot. We’re actually seeing a new level of escalation.”
Marks observed that before the war broke out, Gulf states had come to view Israel as a greater threat to regional stability than Iran, particularly after Israel’s strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar last September.
“That assessment looks very different today,” she said.
Iran’s opening salvo, she added, has been “broad and alarmingly scattershot” – and much worse could be yet to come.
For now, the Gulf states are rapidly recalibrating. Their next moves will depend on whether Iran offers what Marks called “a more rational escalatory ladder” – one that might allow them to stay on the sidelines, exactly where they want to be.
But with their glittering skylines now scarred by missile fire, that option may be fast slipping out of reach.
